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ABSTRACT 
Selective Realism is the most-common ‘type’ of scientific realism.  It groups many diverse 
approaches to science, theories, and truth, and so, it is very difficult to define it with precision. 
Yet, there are three elements which, allegedly, suffice for a general characterization of this 
view, namely: a Non-Miracles Argument motivation, a Pessimistic Meta-Induction 
motivation and selectivity. I contend that such characterization is not robust enough for 
pointing out all the elements that selective realists actually share. In particular, I argue that 
such characterization prevents selective realists from blocking the possibility of true 
contradictions, dialetheias, even if they are not desirable. 
Keywords: Selective realism; contradiction; dialetheia; Pessimistic; Meta-Induction. 
RESUMEN 
El realismo selectivo es el ‘tipo’ de realismo científico más común. Este realismo agrupa 
diversas perspectivas sobre la ciencia, las teorías científicas y las teorías de la verdad, por lo 
que ha resultado muy difícil definirlo con precisión. Sin embargo, hay tres elementos que, 
supuestamente, son suficientes para caracterizar esta posición: una motivación del 
                                                   
1 This research was supported by the PAPIIT Projects IN 403719 “Intensionalidad hasta el final: un nuevo plan 
para la relevancia lógica”, RG 100316 “Explorando la gravitación con la cuántica y viceversa”, IG400219 
“Conciencia y normatividad” and IA401717 “Pluralismo y Normatividad en Lógica y Matemáticas”. 
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Argumento de No Milagros, una motivación de la Meta Inducción Pesimista y el carácter 
selectivo. Aquí sostengo que la esta caracterización no es lo suficientemente robusta para 
señalar todos los elementos que los realistas selectivos de hecho comparten. En particular, 
sostengo que tal caracterización impide que los realistas selectivos prohíban la posibilidad 
de que las contradicciones estén conectadas con la verdad (dialeteias), incluso si éstas son 
no deseables. 
 Palabras clave: Realismo selectivo; contradicción; dialeteia; Meta-Inducción Pesimista. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Scientific realism is a philosophical standpoint that could be characterized as an 
epistemically optimistic attitude towards certain outputs of the scientific inquiry. For many 
scientific realists, such outputs tend to relate the epistemic achievements of the scientific 
theories with the truth (or to the approximate truth) of such theories appealing to the 
successful reference of theoretical terms, to t h e  observable and unobservable things in 
the empirical world (Chakravartty 2017a).  However, recently there has been a tendency on 
the part of some scientific realists to weaken their philosophical theses with respect to the 
success of science. For instance, some of them have suggested that a satisfactory realist 
standpoint should be an extreme epistemically modest and pluralist approach to scientific 
success (Saatsi 2017), leaving many with the impression that scientific realism nowadays is 
nothing like what we once thought it was (Chakravartty 2017b).  
The main concern of this paper is methodological: to address the questions when being a 
selective realist, how much Pessimistic Meta-Induction at the methodological level, is too 
much and when does Pessimistic Meta-Induction cause realists to start losing control of their 
philosophical claims? In particular, I deal with the issue of how the standard characterization 
of ‘scientific selective realism’ (arguably, strongly motivated by the Pessimistic Meta-
Induction) might be not robust enough for pointing out all the elements that selective realists 
actually share. 
Selective realism is the most-common type of scientific realism. It groups many diverse ─and 
not always mutually compatible─ approaches to science, theories and truth, and so, it is very 
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difficult to define it with precision. However, there is a common agreement on the fact 
that the indicative features of selective realism are the following:  
a)  A Non-Miracles motivation (henceforth, NM-motivation): The conjecture of the 
scientific success of a given theory not being caused by luck, but by a connection between 
the theory and the truth. 
b) The Selectivity Feature: The assumption that, while scientific theories as a whole often 
cannot be true, particular sections of our best scientific theories can actually be linked to 
the truth. 
c) The Pessimistic Meta-Induction motivation: (henceforth, PMI-motivation): This 
implies the defeasibility of the realist commitments: “scientific success is (highly) 
indicative of truth, but does not guarantee it” (Vickers 2018 2). This constituted 
the shared intuition that realists should be extremely cautious when making and 
dismissing any realist commitment towards an apparently successful theory –as it 
might end up being either an instance of only apparent success or an instance of 
legitimate success being neglected by the philosophical or scientific communities.   
 
In the corresponding literature, it has been suggested that (a) and (c) are sufficient conditions 
for satisfactorily characterizing ‘selective realism’ (Chakravartty 2017a, 2017b; Lyons 2006; 
Saatsi 2017; Trizzio 2015; Vickers 2015, 2016). Here I contend that (a) and (c) might be not 
robust enough for pointing out all the elements that selective realists actually share. I show 
how a very minimal type of selective realism, committed to (a) and (c), will necessarily allow 
for true contradictions, namely, dialetheias –even if selective realists consider them to be 
not desirable –and I blame (c) for it. 
In order to do so, I proceed as follows: in section 2, I introduce the traditional debate about 
scientific realism, in particular, I focus on the non-miracles argument and the pessimistic 
meta-Induction argument. In section 3, I present the generalities of the selective realist 
position. Section 4 is devoted to introducing a type of selective realism that is based only on 
PMI and the selective character, which I show that cannot block certain entities, such as 
contradictions, to be linked to the (partial) truth. In section 5 I problematize the general 
characterization of selective realism. Finally, in section 6, I draw some conclusions.  
2. SCIENTIFIC REALISM: BASIC ARGUMENTS 
This section aims to briefly introduce two of the most important arguments for the realist- 
antirealist debate. In order to do so, in what follows I will shortly introduce the so-called 
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‘No-Miracles’ argument (see Putnam 1975) and the argument from the ‘Pessimistic Meta-
Induction’ (see Laudan 1981). 
2.1 No-Miracles Argument 
It is well accepted that one of the main aims of our (empirical) scientific theories is to provide 
us with information about the external world, information that can help us to measure, 
predict, anticipate, and modify some aspects of particular empirical domains (Cf. Hempel 
2000). As a matter of fact, it seems that giving explanations and predictions is the main goal 
of a scientific theory since without predictive or explanatory power an empirical theory 
would not be anything but a collection of sentences that talk about empirical entities in the 
same way they could be talking about fantastic tales. 
If a theory’s predictions are fulfilled and its explanations actually help us to understand in a 
better way the empirical domain that we are studying, it seems that we are justified to 
consider this particular theory as scientifically successful (rather predictively or 
explanatorily successful). More important, when having scientific success regarding a 
particular theory, one is justified to believe in that theory (Cf. Davey 2014), i.e., to treat that 
empirical theory as if one believed it. 
Now, the question that unsurprisingly emerges here is: why should we establish a link 
between scientific success and our realist commitments regarding empirical theories? Along 
the last century, many philosophers of science have tried to respond to that question and –
despite the fact that some of them differed in their particular realistic proposals- in general, 
realist philosophers of science have agreed that the best explanation for scientific success 
could be expressed in terms of the No-Miracles Argument (henceforth, NMA). 
NMA is a central argument in the defense of scientific realism that was first introduced by 
Putnam (1975) and that aims to show that we could reasonably believe our best scientific 
theories to be approximately true. The argument goes as follows: 
The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that does not make the 
success of science a miracle. That terms in mature scientific theories typically refer (this 
formulation is due to Richard Boyd), that the theories accepted in a mature science are 
typically approximately true, that the same terms can refer to the same even when they occurs 
in different theories –these statements are viewed not as necessary truths but as part of the 
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scientific explanation of the success of science, and hence as part of any adequate description 
of science and its relations to its objects (Putnam 1975 73). 
So, in general terms, NMA: 
aims to defend the realist claim that successful scientific theories should be accepted as true 
(or, better, near true) descriptions of the world, in both its observable and its unobservable 
aspects. In particular, the realist claim is that accepting that successful scientific theories 
describe truly (or near truly) the unobservable world best explains why these theories are 
empirically successful. That is, it best explains why the observable phenomena as they are 
predicted to be by those theories (Psilos 1999 71).  
Yet, even though the NMA seems to be a strong motivation for a realist position, it doesn’t 
privilege any particular type of realism. 
2.2 Pessimistic Meta-Induction 
As a response to the NMA, Laudan (1981) provided an argument that aimed at convincing the 
realist community that some of their strongest commitments were not justified by the history 
of science.   
In order to present such an argument, Laudan required that first philosophers of science agree 
on the fact that philosophical theses could be, in a sense, ‘empirically tested’.  This meant, 
for the particular case of the philosophical debate on scientific realism, that history of science 
was assumed to work for the philosophy of science as empirical evidence works for the 
empirical sciences. 
A growing number of philosophers (including Boyd, Newton-Smith, Shimony, Putnam, 
Friedman, and Niiniluoto) have argued that the theses of epistemic realism are open to 
empirical test. The suggestion that epistemological doctrines have much the same empirical 
status as the sciences is a welcome one: for, whether it stands up to detailed scrutiny or not, 
it marks a significant facing-up by the philosophical community to one of the most neglected 
(and most notorious) problems of philosophy: the status of epistemological claims. (Laudan 
1981 19) 
It is important to notice that, for Laudan’s project (at least, by 1981), history of science was 
expected to play the role of the final judge in the debate of scientific realism vs. antirealism. 
The main assumption of Laudan’s methodology was that, if (convergent) realism was the 
case, then historical evidence should show that for any historical case of scientific success 
relations and referents from old theories were preserved in successor theories. It should show 
as well that new successful theories were explanatory of the success of their predecessors. 
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However, the history of science was, according to Laudan, not so benevolent with scientific 
realism. As a matter of fact, it showed that some old successful theories were not necessarily 
preserved by their successors. This is, we now know that some of our previous theories were 
false and that is the reason why they were abandoned (not preserved) in the first place.  In 
order to illustrate this, Laudan provided a list of twelve theories that, at their time, were 
believed to be successful and that are now known to be false. Such a list includes the 
crystalline spheres of ancient and medieval astronomy, the humoral theory of medicine, the 
effluvial theory of static electricity, the phlogiston theory of chemistry, the caloric theory of 
heat, theories of spontaneous generation, among others (Laudan1981 34). 
Putting together all the above, Laudan presents a threatening argument against convergent 
realism.  Such an argument is the so-called Pessimistic Meta-Induction (PMI) and it can be 
summarized as follows: 
The history of science is full of theories which at different times and for long periods had 
been empirically successful, and yet were shown to be false in the deep-structure claims they 
made about the world. It is similarly full of theoretical terms featuring in successful theories 
which do not refer. Therefore, by a simple (meta-)induction on scientific theories, our current 
successful theories are likely to be false (or, at any rate, are more likely to be false than true), 
and many or most of the theoretical terms featuring in them will turn out to be non-referential. 
Therefore, the empirical success of a theory provides no warrant for the claim that the theory 
is approximately true. There is no substantive retention at the theoretical, or deep-structural, 
level and no referential stability in theory-change (Psillos 1999 101, my emphasis). 
The argument from the PMI is well known to be part of a larger project: Laudan’s project for 
integrating history and philosophy of science ─in such a way that history could be used also 
as evidence for testing philosophical theses. In that sense, Laudan assumes that while 
philosophical doctrines about science tend to provide (good) theoretical reasons for 
endorsing certain attitudes regarding science, historical evidence supporting the theses in 
question is always required and plays a privileged role for the validation of certain 
philosophical commitments. So, even if the arguments in favor of scientific realism are valid, 
if they lack historical evidence, then, those arguments might seldom tell us anything about 
science, and history might be not filling up philosophy as it is expected to happen. So, 
Laudan’s PMI could be seen (in its weakest version) as an invitation for scientific realists to 
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provide, as part of the core of their realistic standpoint, an explanation of the future and the 
past failure of our best and most reliable scientific theories.  
2.3 A Methodology Based on PMI 
However, PMI is more than just a recurrent argument from the debates about scientific 
realism, it is a privileged instance of a fruitful methodology, namely, the confrontation of 
philosophical theses with historical evidence.  As a matter of fact, PMI reinforced the idea 
that historical evidence can be of great use when discovering the scope and the limitations of 
our own philosophical theories. It is in that sense, in which philosophers have employed the 
intuitions behind PMI to confront different types of philosophical theses with different types 
of historical evidence (either from the history of science or from the history of philosophy, 
among others).  An exemplar of the uses of such methodology can be found in (Saatsi 2017), 
where the author provides a PMI-type of reflection on the lessons from the history of 
philosophy regarding the success of our theories of scientific realism.  
Saatsi argues that the history of philosophy has shown that unified theories of scientific 
realism seem non-achievable. History has taught us that the greatest accomplishment that our 
general philosophical realist theories have gotten is a partial success; this is, while they have 
been explanatory of some case studies, they have left unexplained other relevant cases. As 
part of his analysis, Saatsi examines a diversity of realist theories and the different ways in 
which they have failed. The result of Saatsi’s scrutiny is that, in order to prevent the constant 
failure of realist theories and maximize the explanatory power of such accounts, philosophers 
should endorse a more pluralistic understanding of scientific realism.  
This is, nonetheless, a very controversial proposal. Scientific realism has been always 
considered to be a philosophical phenomenon with only one correct explanation, and if 
history of philosophy has taught us that, maybe, the correct approach to scientific realism is 
via a multiplicity of explanations (different types of philosophical explanations for different 
chunks of cases from the history of science), this is definitely a challenge for the traditional 
view.  
Regardless if  Saatsi’s solution is satisfactory, his approach is revealing in two senses: first, 
it illustrates a peculiar use of the PMI-methodology in the scientific realism-debate; in 
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particular, it shows that when applying PMI in the methodological realm, confronting 
philosophy with its own history, realists can still enlighten possible routes for the 
philosophical defense for scientific realism. Second, it shows that PMI type of arguments 
motivates philosophers to contemplate two different scenarios: 
 when the early successful theories are no longer considered to be as successful as before, and  
 when allegedly mistaken theories are discovered to be (more) successful than expected.  
Take the above to be the two sides of a Pessimistic Meta-Induction Motivation –at the 
methodological level. On the one hand, the first option addresses the worry of confusing 
cases of legitimate success with cases of apparent success. On the other hand, the second 
alternative addresses the worry of mistaking cases of success with cases of ‘lucky accidents’. 
Much more can be said about the scope and the limitations of these two traditional arguments, 
but I hope this suffices for the purposes of this paper. In what follows, I introduce selective 
realism and explain why this type of realism is motivated by both NMA and PMI. 
3. ON SELECTIVE REALISM 
 
This paper aims at testing the robustness of the standard characterization of selective realism. 
In order to do so, in this section I broadly introduce selective realism and discuss which are the 
sufficient conditions that a realist standpoint should fulfill in order to be considered as selective 
realism. Later on, I present a realistic position that possesses exclusively those features; I call it 
minimalist selective realism –which robustness I further evaluate in sections 4 and 5. 
3.1 Selective Realism  and the Selectivity Feature 
As I argued in section 2, since the beginning, the Non-Miracles Argument has been in the core 
of scientific realism. However, as NMA is an abductive argument, its role cannot be other than 
motivational. But NMA is not the only guidance available for realists. During the last decades, 
scientific realists have also shaped their views by endorsing the historical challenge that the 
Pessimistic Meta-Induction poses.  This has made any contemporary scientific realism to be 
motivated by both, PMI and NMA.  However, as the role that NMA plays in the defense of 
scientific realism might seem obvious to the reader, here I focus particularly on the importance 
of PMI for any selective realist standpoint.  
First, in the corresponding literature, PMI has also been labeled as the ‘historical challenge’, 
and it has been systematically argued that 
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A refined version of realism will take up the challenge deriving from a pessimistic reading 
of historical records. A realist knows or at any rate expects that our current scientific theories 
will be modified by future scientific research in ways that cannot simply be equated to 
emendation, completion or improvement. The way out of the difficulty of mediating between 
the realist intuition that the success of science is a sign that its theories cannot be completely 
false on the one hand and the various arguments akin to the pessimistic meta-induction on 
the other is often given in terms of positions that can be defined as “selective or preservative 
realism” (Trizio 2015 139).  
All selective realists share what here I call the selectivity feature. This is, the conjecture that, 
while scientific theories as a whole often cannot be true, particular sections of our best 
scientific theories can actually be linked to the approximate truth. Depending on the type of 
selective realism that is being endorsed, one can identify very different types of explanations 
of how this connection with truth takes place in science; so far we have almost as many ways 
to link science to the truth as there are selective realists (Saatsi 2017). 
In other words, 
Selective realism is a philosophical standpoint defending that every instance of the novel 
success of a scientific theory is related to specific relevant parts of the theory in question and 
that scientists are justified to commit specifically to those parts of the theory in a realistic 
way. Which are those parts of the scientific theories that we could interpret realistically 
depends on the particular type of selective realism we choose; there is structural realism, 
semi-realism, divide-et- impera, eclectic realism, among others (Chakravartty 2017a, my 
emphasis). 
Second, the selectivity feature is not the only result of PMI in this debate. As a matter of fact, 
an additional feature that all selective realists have in common is what here I call the PMI-
Motivation.  
 
3.2 Selective Realism and the PMI-Motivation 
Regardless the particular type of selective realism that one stands for, one of the greatest 
challenges for the scientific realist is to explain why previous scientific theories that were 
accepted for a long time appealing to their predictive or explanatory power, ended up being 
abandoned (and believed to be false). Thus, the selective realists’ commitment to the 
historical challenge has made this broad type of realism to be PMI motivated in, at least, two 
senses: 
a. Regarding ‘truth’: Since the emergence of Laudan’s PMI, scientific realism has 
been seen as involving merely “a defeasible commitment: scientific success is 
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(highly) indicative of truth, but does not guarantee it” (Vickers 2018 2). So, every 
time that a selective realist provides an explanation for the scientific success of a 
specific theory, there is a chance of her explanation being mistaken or of the 
alleged success being only apparent. In order to reduce the chances of being wrong, 
selective realists tend to narrow as much as possible the set of elements of a theory 
that they considered being connected to the partial truth -knowing that their 
standpoints can always fail when facing PMI. 
b. Regarding ‘falsehood’: selective realists have become extremely cautious giving 
up the possibility of saying anything definitive about falsehoods. So they have 
prevented PMI-type counterexamples about falsities in science. In particular, cases of the 
types: a segment of a theory that once was thought to be false ends up being a candidate 
for the approximate truth; or (a segment of) a theory that was considered to be successful 
only by coincidence,  end ups being a legitimate candidate for the partial truth years later 
–like, allegedly, happened to the “The Sommerfeld puzzle” (Cf. Vickers 2018). 
These two components, (a) and (b), have been considered to be constitutive of any selective 
realist standpoint. However, while (a) has been often made explicit in the literature as one of 
the most distinctive features of selective realism, (b) has somehow been neglected. 
Nonetheless, (b) is of vital importance for understanding why selective realism is an 
especially cautious standpoint. Let me press further this point by appealing to an example of 
its importance.  
3.2.1. Sommerfeld and PMI Regarding the ‘Falsehood’ 
The so-called ‘Sommerfeld’s puzzle’ is a case study from the early quantum physics (early 
XX century) that has been used to illustrate ‘miraculous’ scientific success, and it has been 
constantly considered as strongly problematic for scientific realists. The case goes as follows:  
In Sommerfeld (1916)—building on Bohr’s 1913 model of the hydrogen atom—Sommerfeld 
derived the fine structure formula for the allowed energy states of unperturbed hydrogen, and 
thus via E hv   the possible frequencies of the hydrogen spectral lines (for 1Z  ):
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From which m0 represents the rest mass of the electron, c corresponds to the speed of light, 
α is the fine structure constant equal to 2 /e c , nr, and nφ are the radial and angular quantum 
numbers, and Z indicates the proton number. 
An important feature of Sommerfeld’s fine structure formula was that, despite the fact that, 
at that exact moment, physicists had a very little understanding of the atom and the principles 
of quantum physics, Sommerfeld’s formula allowed scientists to arrive at novel and 
extremely accurate predictions of spectral lines –in addition, it was successful when applied 
to ionized atoms of more elements than just hydrogen. However, despite its success, scientists 
at the time did not feel comfortable endorsing realist commitments towards Sommerfeld’s 
formula, basically because the formula seemed to neglect different important features such 
as wave mechanics and spin –being spin a causal element of the fine structure splitting.  In 
addition, due to the lack of understanding of the atom at the time, scientists felt that 
Sommerfeld's success lacked an explanation, and so, it was considered to be a merely ‘lucky 
accident’ (see for instance: Heisenberg 1968 534; Biedenharn 1983 14; Brown et ál.1995 92; 
among others). “Curiously, physicists have often described this case as a ‘miracle’, and even 
as a ‘cosmic joke’, directly contradicting (unintentionally!) the ‘no miracles’ or ‘no cosmic 
coincidences’ argument for scientific realism” (Vickers 2018 7). 
Nonetheless, in Vickers (2018) a defense of a realist reading of the Sommerfield’s formula 
is presented. The main argument goes as follows: 
• First, there is a common agreement among scientists and philosophers of science on the 
fact that the Sommerfeld formula is an exemplar of remarkable scientific success.  
• Second, it is well known that Sommerfeld himself did not have a neat explanation of 
why his formula was so successful. And as a matter of fact, because it neglected the spin 
property –which was considered to be fundamental for the analysis of fine structure–, the 
formula was taken to be false.  
• Third, any realist, as cautious as she wants to be, would feel motivated by the NMA and 
would be inclined to look for an explanation of such success regardless if it was available 
to the scientists at the time or not.  
• Fourth, for the Sommerfeld case, in the long run it became clear that his formula was a 
direct derivation of the relativistic Dirac Quantum Mechanics (and as it is possible to 
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formulate Quantum Mechanics in such a way in which spin is not a fundamental property, 
so it seems that, according to such type of interpretation, Sommerfeld’s formula was not 
contradicting any basic principle of the Quantum theory).  
• Finally, considering all the above, Vickers explains the fact that, despite the intuitions 
of the scientists at the time indicated common agreement regarding that no realist 
commitment should be held towards the Sommerfeld formula, in the long run, scientific 
realists could provide an explanation of why such a success was the case. 
Now, I presented this case study to illustrate the importance of allowing past theories, that 
were once believed to be false, to be latter on candidates for the partial truth. In this sense, as 
the contemporary realist is especially worried of being sensitive to the historical information 
in order to avoid damaging PMI counterexamples, she would have to be open to the two 
possibilities: successful theories being partially false, and allegedly false theories being 
candidates for the partial truth. 
If what I have presented in this section is along the right lines, the PMI motivations are what 
leads the contemporary realist to selectivity, as the more precise and abstract the elements that 
she selects are, the easiest it is to track them in the new successful theories and to inspect the 
old ones. 
As the initial motivation for this paper was to defend that selectivity and PMI-motivations are 
not enough to characterize the standard selective realist, in the next section I will introduce the 
minimalist selective realism, which is the realist standpoint that only uses NMA, selectivity, and 
PMI-motivations, in order to evaluate its robustness in section 5. 
4.  ON THE POSSIBILITY OF SELECTIVE REALIST DIALETHEISM 
This section aims at problematizing the minimalist characterization of selective realism. In 
order to do so, I will focus only on the role that falsehoods play for this realistic standpoint –
something that we have already anticipated in the previous section. 
Despite the fact that many versions of selective realism could be identified in the literature, 
a minimalist way to characterize this philosophical position is to recognize that “they all share 
the features of being based on a discussion of actual historical case studies and of being 
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compatible, to a certain extent, with the prospect of future major changes” (Trizio 2015 139).  
Considering what has been presented in section 3 as the common features of selective 
realism-namely, NMA, selectivity, and PMI-motivation regarding truth and falsehood-, here I 
will assume that a minimalist selective realism will be a standpoint which shares at least all 
those features (Chakravartty 2017a; Trizio 2015). 
Now, considering that the characterization of minimalist selective realism presented above is 
accurate, and that the defenders of this standpoint cannot say anything definitive about 
falsehood (as it was argued appealing to the Sommerfeld’s case study); a question naturally 
emerges: despite the fact that we have strong intuitions of some things being ‘always’ false, 
if one is a minimalist selective realist, does one should abandon irremediably those 
intuitions?  
In what follows, I present the option of being a selective realist and take true contradictions as 
candidates for (definitive) falsehood. Later on, I argue that this option would lead the realist to face 
the following dilemma: either it is not possible for the minimalist selective realism to dismiss the 
possibility of true contradictions in the sciences or selective realists share more than just NMA, 
selectivity and PMI-motivations.  
4.1 Minimalist Selective Realism and true contradictions 
First of all, it is common wisdom that contradictions are logically false, hence never true, 
and this is taken to be known by any scientist.  Furthermore, it is commonly thought that 
anyone knowingly believing a falsity is an irrational agent. From this, it seems to follow that 
a scientist believing an inconsistent theory must be irrational. The idea behind this assumption 
is that if while examining our empirical theories we presuppose the basic principles of classical 
logic (or any other explosive logic), then because of the explosion principle, “an inconsistent 
theory implies any conceivable observational prediction as well as it’s negation and thus tells 
us nothing about the world” (Hempel 2000 79), which is widely understood as the absolute 
failure of the theory for scientific purposes. 
However, a more recent view has claimed that, more often than we’d like to believe, scientists 
tolerate inconsistencies in science. This perspective has been enriched by the study of 
paraconsistent logics and the emergence of case studies from the philosophy of science that 
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seems to illustrate how the presence of some contradictions do not necessarily mean the 
explosion of the theory in question. The main assertion of those defending this standpoint is 
that, contrary to what the traditional view might suggest, inconsistent theories do not always 
have to be rejected (cf. Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977; Smith 1988; Meheus 2002; Priest 2002). 
Nonetheless, it has been said that the reason why scientists usually tolerate the presence of 
inconsistency is that they do not believe that such contradictions are true (Vickers 2013; 
Pincock 2014). As a matter of fact, they tend to explain that those contradictions are harmless 
basically because they are used as fictions, idealizations, heuristics, among other things. But 
even those who endorse inconsistency toleration theses tend to agree to the fact that “if a 
body of accepted claims has a model, then we can hope that there is some less than perfect 
isomorphism between that model and the world. But an inconsistent body of claims has no 
model. So it seems such a body of claims can’t be even approximately true” (Brown 1990 
282). 
But, there is a philosophical standpoint that takes the inconsistency toleration a bit further 
and claims that some inconsistencies are tolerated not only because they are not explosive, 
but because they are true. The defenders of such positions are called dialetheists. 
A dialetheia is a truth-bearer, p, such that both it and a negation of it, not-p, are true. 
Dialetheism is the view that there are dialetheias. A contradiction is a pair of sentences, one 
of which is a negation of the other, or a conjunction of such sentences. Therefore, dialetheism 
amounts to the claim that there are true contradictions. 
Roughly, to be a realist about some kind of entities and its (lack of) possession of properties 
is to maintain that such entities objectively exist and possess (or lack) their properties apart 
from, and antecedently to, anyone’s thought of them, and that thoughts, beliefs, and theories 
concerning such entities and their properties are made objectively true or objectively false by 
them, apart from what is thought of them. If one accepts realism, the truth of some 
contradictions entails the existence of inconsistent objects or states of affairs, namely those 
that contribute to make them true. To say that the world has inconsistent parts just is to say 
that some true purely descriptive sentences about the world have true negations. Realist 
dialetheism is characterized then as the conjunction of dialetheism and a mild realism: there 
are true contradictions, and at least part of what makes them true exists objectively and 
independently of anyone’s thought, language, etc. (Estrada-González 2014 197-198). 
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Given such characterization of what means to be a realist dialetheist, in what follows I 
present two different minimalist selective realist positions: one that endorses dialetheism and 
one that aims to reject it. 
4.1.1 (Minimalist) Selective-Realist Dialetheism 
If PMI-motivation regarding falsehood is just along the right lines, regardless our intuitions 
about contradictions being logically false (and hence, never true), if a case of remarkable 
scientific success is linked to the presence of a true contradiction, then the minimalist 
selective realist should accept that contradictions might be connected to the partial truth –in 
a similar sense in which she had to accept that the Sommerfeld puzzle was not a mere case 
of luck.  
If the selective realist had to accept the possibility of true contradictions, she would be 
considered to be sympathetic to a minimalist selective realist dialetheism, which can be 
defined as follows: 
Minimalist Realist Dialetheism: this is the standpoint in which (minimalist) selective 
realist not only allows for the possibility of contradictions in science, but also for the 
possibility of some of those contradictions being connected to the theoretical truth.  
Now, if the minimal characterization of selective realist is correct, and i f  selective realist 
cannot say anything about what will be necessarily false in science, then to be a realist 
dialetheist will depend only on the possibility that one has to find true contradictions in 
science; this is, on the possibility that one has to find scientific success linked to 
contradictions. 
4.1.2 The Exemplar 
In Estrada-González (2014) and Flores-Gallardo (2018) a case of an allegedly true 
contradiction in graph theory and category theory is presented. Such case goes as follows: 
For such an example, It will be assumed that objects and their parts satisfy the following 
 I. There are objects of different kinds, and an object X (of a certain kind) might be thought 
of as a type, collection of things, or generalized set – the X’s. 
II. Among objects of a kind, there are subkinds, some of which are basic and others are 
derived. 
III. Objects might have parts, which are again objects of the kind in question, and in that case 
an object is a structured combination of its parts. 
IV. The parthood relation is reflexive, anti-symmetric, and transitive. 
(Estrada-González 2014 204). 
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First, A graph is a pair of sets F and V (sets of “arrows” and of “vertices”, 
respectively) with a pair of functions s: F→V and t: F→V. If x is an element of F, an 
arrow, s(x) is its “source” and t(x) its ‘target’.  
Second, one could identify the following types of graphs: 
– Vertices 
– Arrows whose source and target coincide 
– Arrows whose source and target are different 
– There are also derived subkinds, given by any combination of the basic 
subkinds (for example, the derived sub kind of graphs consisting of naked 
vertices and arrows with different source and target, etc.) 
 (Estrada-González 2014 204).  
With that in mind, given an object O and a part P (of O), its negation (NEG) is defined as 
follows: The not-P’s are the smallest part of O such that its union with the P’s contains all 
the objects (in O); i.e., the negation of an object is defined through an exhaustive strategy. 
Now, according to Flores-Gallardo, from NEG, it is possible to provide the criteria of truth 
and falsity for a formula Pa, if and only if a belongs to the P or non-P respectively. 
With this, Estrada González defines a propositional negation ‘¬’ in the following way: ¬φ is 
false if and only if φ is true; ¬φ is true in any other case. Estrada González shows that, for 
graphs composed only of isolated vertices (or fewer sets of points), ¬ behaves like a classic 
negation; but in the case of directed graphs (or graphs with arrows), dialetheias can be found 
in broken objects in such a way that the arrows of P and not-P have a vertex in common 
(which is possible even if NEG is satisfied) (Flores-Gallardo 2018 55, my translation). 
Now, the standard realist might protest against this exemplar of realist dialetheism. She might 
argue that even ingenious, this illustration of dialetheias in category and graph theory is far 
from requiring any realist commitments. However, a response to this objection is also present 
in Estrada-González (2014 205-206); there it is argued that graphs could be taken as 
describing objective structures of the world –as it is taken for granted that the world has a 
geometrical structure that is often studied with the notion of smooth spaces. So, graphs could 
be describing physical locations, and arrows processes for getting from one location to 
another. And “there are even more audacious claims, for example, that the entire world is a 
graph (of individuals and identity-giving relations; see Dipert 1997) or that the fundamental 
level of reality is a graph (cf. Bird 2007)” (Estrada-González 2014 206). 
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So, even if now we have not the certainty of dialetheias being connected to the empirical 
world via graph theory, if one is a PMI-motivated selective realist, one should accept the 
possibility of dialetheias being candidates for the partial truth. 
4.2 (Minimalist) Selective-realist Anti-dialetheist  
Now, as one can infer from the literature on scientific realism, to accept the possibility of 
true contradictions is an unpopular view. As a matter of fact, much effort has been made in 
order to provide explanations about how the alleged cases of inconsistent science either were 
not really contradictory or were not cases of contradictions linked to the partial truth (see for 
instance: Saatsi & Vickers 2011; Vickers 2013; Saatsi 2014). In that sense, it seems necessary 
to recognize another standpoint in the debate about scientific realism and true contradictions: 
the (minimalist) selective-realist anti-dialetheist. Such a standpoint could be characterized as 
follows: 
 Minimalist Selective-realist anti-dialetheist: this is the standpoint in which 
(minimalist) selective realism claims that theoretical truth (regarding science) can only 
be reached through scientific success, but that this success cannot be achieved through 
dialetheias. 
As I mentioned before, in general, it is not a common maneuver to be realistically committed 
to contradictions, not even in the realm of philosophical studies of inconsistent science. As a 
matter of fact, even the ones who defend that contradictions could be and actually are 
tolerated in the sciences (cf. Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977; Smith 1988; Brown 1990; Meheus 
2002; Priest 2002) would not necessarily agree on contradictions being candidates for the 
partial truth.  
5. THE PROBLEM 
I devoted the last section to introduce two possible realist standpoints regarding true 
contradictions in science: on the one hand, one that allows for true contradictions, and on 
the other hand, one that forbids them. So far, this disjunction seems legitimate, one can 
choose either one option or the other according to one’s philosophical and scientific 
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commitments. However, here I argue that this is not that easy, and that it might be the second 
option the one that is not available to the standard selective realist.   
The argument is quite simple: 
(1) The standard characterization of selective realism includes the NMA motivation, the 
selectivity character and the PMI-motivations (regarding both truth and falsehood). 
In addition, as I discussed in section 2.3, selective realists also tend to use a 
methodology inspired by the PMI.  
(2) The PMI methodology usually is understood as the possibility of testing philosophical 
theses against the history of science (or of philosophy).  
(3) The PMI motivation regarding falsehood could be summarized as follows: selective 
realists gave up the possibility of saying anything definitive about falsehoods. So 
they have prevented PMI-type counterexamples about falsities in science. In 
particular, cases of the types: a segment of a theory that once was thought to be false 
ends up being a candidate for the approximate truth; or (a segment of) a theory that 
was considered to be successful only by coincidence end ups being a legitimate 
candidate for the partial truth years later. 
C. At this point, the problem that emerges might seem clear to the reader. If the standard 
characterization of selective realism is actually exhaustive of all the elements that 
selective realists share, by (3), it seems that selective realists might not be allowed to 
forbid dialethieas to be linked to the partial truth.  In general terms, by (1) and (3), the 
selective realist cannot prohibit anything a priori in science, thus she cannot say that 
specific types of entities, such as contradictions, are necessarily false. Ergo it seems 
that the anti-dialetheist standpoint is impossible for minimalist selective realists –and 
in a sense, should also be impossible for the selective realist. 
Of course this could be non-problematic if selective realists would not endorse anti-
dialetheist views. However, 
(4) In the corresponding literature, it is extremely rare to identify any realist dialetheist 
about science –especially if concerned with sciences distinct from inconsistent 
mathematics, category theory, set theory, and graph theory. As a matter of fact, 
philosophers tend to agree on contradictions being at least not true, and so it seems 
counterintuitive that selective realists should allow for dialetheias in the realist realm 
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(See Brown 1990; Saatsi & Vickers 2011; Vickers 2013; Saatsi 2014). In addition, 
even dialetheists do not seem to demand that contradictions, if true, are the link 
between the scientific theories and the partial truth, in particular, they do not argue 
either in favor of dialetheias to be preserved under theory change, for instance. So, 
even if contradictions can be true (in a sense), it is not clear, that selective realism 
should consider them as candidates for the partial truth (cf. Priest 2002; Flores-
Gallardo 2018). 
As the reader can notice (c) and (4) conflict with each other. I believe the source of this 
conflict to be (2) and the inefficient way in which PMI methodology has been understood.  
It seems to me that the problem lays on the use of the PMI methodology that required 
philosophical theories to be contrasted with the historical evidence in the same way in which 
physicists contrast their predictions with the experimental reports. However, one can argue 
that when discussing the pertinence of dialetheias in the scientific realism debate, what it is 
really in content is a logical principle –which is, in a sense, stronger than an empirical theory 
about science. 
Finally, it seems to me that (c) could be indicating that something very fishy is going on with 
our standard characterization of selective realism. One suggestion might be that such 
characterization tries to group so much distinct standpoints that it ends up being mistaken –
as it has been already indicated in (4), large groups of scientific realists privilege (logical) 
consistency (see for instance Chakravartty 2017c Chap. 6) over other epistemic virtues. I 
think that what this suggests is that, if ever being as modest as a minimal selective realist, it 
is necessary also to endorse certain logical constrains that allow us to explain the success of 
science in the most metaphysically simple way available. It also suggest that maybe all 
scientific realist do so and that that fact should be incorporated to the general characterization 
of selective realism. 
In sum, we could be facing the following dilemma: either minimalist selective realist cannot 
explain why and how to forbid dialetheias in science or our general characterization of 
selective realism is mistaken because it leaves room for dangerous possibilities that none of 
the selective realists has ever endorsed.  
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I hope to have shown that many more questions remain to be explored regarding selective 
realism and logical constraints, and also that this insight will stimulate further investigations 
in this field. 
CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, I argued that the PMI could (and should) be understood as an invitation for 
scientific realists to endorse some historicists commitments and to provide, as part of the 
core of their realistic standpoint, an explanation of the future and the past failure of our best 
and most reliable scientific theories. I also defended that it is, in fact, the historicist challenge 
what has motivated many of the current standpoints of selective realism. 
In order to explore the limits of the general characterization of selective realism, taking all 
the elements that allegedly characterize selective realism, I presented a realist view: 
minimalist selective realism. I argued that many selective realists are facing the risk of 
becoming, in some sense, a selective dialetheist realist if they ─as a consequence of their 
PMI motivations─ keep trying to avoid saying anything conclusive about what can never be 
true in science. 
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